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SYMPOSIUM ON JEFFREY L. DUNOFF AND MARK A. POLLACK, “THE JUDICIAL
TRILEMMA”
SYSTEMIC JUDICIAL AUTHORITY: THE “FOURTH CORNER” OF “THE JUDICIAL
TRILEMMA”?
Gleider Hernández*
Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack’s Judicial Trilemma1 is a refreshing challenge to prevailing narratives about judi-
cial decision-making in international courts and tribunals and is part of a growing wave of scholarship deploying
empirical, social science-driven methodology to theorize the place of judicial institutions in the international legal
ﬁeld.2 Seeking to peek behind the black robes and divine the reasoning behind judicial decisions without descend-
ing into speculation and actively trying to thwart considerations of conﬁdentiality is a fraught endeavor on which
I have expressed skepticism in the past.3 The Judicial Trilemma admirably seeks to overcome these challenges, and
I commend the authors for tackling the hard question as to whether one can truly glance behind the black robe.
I started my academic career writing about judicial reasoning at the ICJ, seeking to explain the institutional,
sociological, and structural factors which positioned that institution—a wider theoretical project that has since
grown into a study of the social processes which constitute authority within the international legal process. But
I also come to the domain having spent considerable time peeking behind the black robes themselves, both as a
judicial clerk at the ICJ, and also as a special assistant to an investment arbitral tribunal. In this regard, I appreciate
the challenges inherent in seeking to discern the “reality” of judicial decision-making and the obstacles of conﬁ-
dentiality and institutional loyalty that risk “contaminating” the data. Nevertheless, I will make two speciﬁc points
in my comment on Dunoff and Pollack’s commendable piece: ﬁrst, in relation to some assumptions embedded in
their methodological analysis; and secondly, reﬂections on what is perhaps the fourth “corner” that has not been
addressed in their Trilemma, namely, the institutional or collective authority of the judicial institution in play.
Methodological Questions
The ﬁrst methodological caveat relates to the fact that judges and arbitrators owe a degree of institutional loyalty.
The issue arises because the preservation of the authority of the institution, or even of the legal system itself, can
often be elided with that individual judge’s concern over status and respect from his or her own peers, and may in
some respects be contingent on the regard of those peers.4 I am expressing here a concern with the design of the
* Associate Professor (Reader) in Public International Law, Durham Law School.
1 Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 AJIL 225 (2017).
2 See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014); YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2014).
3 See GLEIDER I. HERNÁNDEZ, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 127 (2014).
4 See id. at 106.
doi:10.1017/aju.2017.81
The American Society of International Law and Gleider Hernández © 2017. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
349
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.81
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Durham University Library, on 13 Nov 2017 at 11:28:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Trilemma itself: I do not think that the design of the Trilemma takes sufﬁcient notice of this fourth consideration,
“institutional authority,” in an institution’s desire to preserve the secrecy of its deliberations. Perhaps institutional
authority is a facet of judicial independence; but in many respects, it is sufﬁciently distinct from the independence
of the individual judge. Dunoff and Pollack’s concerns about the need for reelection, and about the possibility of
dissenting or separate opinions, overwhelmingly emphasize the consequences for an individual judge, with insuf-
ﬁcient emphasis on the consequences for the institution’s authority. These exist, to my mind, in a mutually rein-
forcing process.5
The importance of institutional authority is buttressed by my second methodological observation, one that is
acknowledged by the authors but perhaps requires greater emphasis, concerning the reliability of the evidence
collected. This is a caveat related to the ﬁrst: judges, arbitrators, and their supporting personnel are explicitly
under a duty of conﬁdentiality and loyalty to the institution. To speak publicly in such a manner as to demean
the institution carries with it signiﬁcant personal risk for the individual concerned, which will not be assumed
lightly. For example, Dunoff and Pollack remark that the judges generally would not concede that reelection
was a concern in their mind, and the judges emphasized that the proper discharge of their duties and the quality
of their decision-making was paramount.6 In other words, the judges sought to depict themselves as above such
pressures, and as committed to serving an international community in the pursuit of justice. The sceptic in me
cannot help but wonder which judge would be glib enough to suggest otherwise, and in this regard, I welcome the
fact that Dunoff and Pollack commented on the more forthright commentary of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the
anonymous former President of the ICJ, both of whom were more open about the anxieties and pressures created
by a reelection system. Such concerns are particularly salient with respect to the authors’ description of the emer-
gence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, and how its own members set about ensuring its
autonomy as well as the judicialization of its internal procedure.7 As such, I applaud the authors for painstakingly
embarking on a series of interviews and on gathering what is possibly the best evidence thus obtained in this
regard, and would join them in cautioning against unhesitatingly accepting the views and arguments expressed
by the interviewees, who have other strategic interests in play besides reelection.
Finally, Dunoff and Pollack are at their most cogent when elaborating on the concerns for judicial indepen-
dence, and the structural threats to such independence posed by a court that is structured to privilege account-
ability and transparency. But I think, as they themselves concede, that they are somewhat caught in a U.S.-centric
discourse of judicial politics, drawing analogies to a system that is structurally, institutionally, and culturally distinct
from that of international law.8 Dunoff and Pollack make no apologies for this—they admit freely that the bulk of
the “judicial politics” literature lies in the study of American federal courts9—but do not seem fully to appreciate
the consequences of adopting such an approach. To this non-American international lawyer, there is something
distinctly unusual in their methodology: because judicial institutions and their politics are understood so differently
in different jurisdictions, the systemic context becomes of heightened importance. Let us take the point on judicial
appointment. The process of judicial appointments, and the politics surrounding these in the United States, pro-
vides little guidance with respect to appointment to an international court, not least due to the difﬁculties in
5 I have developed this idea in id. at ch. IV-V.
6 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 1, at 257, citing José E. Alvarez, What Are International Judges for? The Main Functions of International
Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 158, 173 (Cesare Romano et al. eds., 2014).
7 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 1, at 260–71.
8 See their own deﬁnition of judicial independence, id. at 231: “judicial politics scholars have extensively theorized and empirically studied
the question of judicial independence, broadly deﬁned as the ability of judges to decide cases free of extralegal pressures from outside
actors.”
9 Id. at 233; see also discussion of the WTO, id. at 260–71.
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reconciling the vote of a state at a constituent assembly body (the UNGeneral Assembly for the ICJ, the Assembly
of States Parties at the International Criminal Court) to a judicial appointments process in the United States. The
appointment processes are, whether in the United States or on the international plane, designed for different pur-
poses, with different values at stake, involving different constituencies, and invariably employing a different pro-
cedure involving widely divergent categories of stakeholders. Besides the fact that they are all intended to
determine the place of extralegal pressures and conﬁne them, there is such a qualitative difference between
these appointment processes—and between them and elections to regional courts, or courts in other domestic
legal systems—that for all intents and purposes, they are entirely different methods of judicial selection.
Regrettably, that concern is not explicitly addressed by the authors. Though one can remain certain that sociolegal
American legal scholarship has much to contribute to scholarship on international courts and tribunals, it is my
view that such scholarship is at its most effective when such insights are presented as culturally and institutionally
contingent, and not as universal claims that can apply across cultures, institutions, and legal systems. The Judicial
Trilemma is concerning to me in this regard; it is powerful because it is backed up by empirical evidence, but the
metasupposition that American judicial political theory can be transposed into the realm of international judicial
politics strikes me as slightly eccentric.
Institutional Design and Claims to Institutionalized Authority
Let us continue with a closer examination of the Judicial Trilemma. From the outset, there is a conundrum in the
Judicial Trilemma, in its identiﬁcation of the three core values of independence, accountability, and transparency as
interlocking, mutually exclusive (to the extent that only two can be pursued, necessarily neglecting the third), and as
values. Again, in the authors’ own words, the Trilemma reﬂects potential trade-offs relating to three core values:
(1) judicial independence, the freedom of judges to decide disputes upon the facts and the law, free of outside
inﬂuences such as the preferences of powerful states;
(2) judicial accountability, structural checks on the exercise of individual judicial authority manifested most
prominently in international courts via reappointment processes; and
(3) judicial transparency, speciﬁcally mechanisms that permit the identiﬁcation of individual judicial posi-
tions, primarily through the publication of separate votes or opinions.10
Dunoff and Pollack’s introduction implies that, in the Judicial Trilemma, they have engaged with inductive and
deductive methodologies in constructing their model. It is a normative model, in that they draw on sociological
techniques of institutional design to describe the intentions of the states that created these judicial institutions. But
it is, equally, a descriptive model that seeks to incorporate the ﬁnely-balanced considerations that individual judges
must address when discharging their functions, as those emerged throughout the interview process and through
further empirical work. In their own words,
[u]nderstanding the founding moments of design, however, tells only part of the story, because the actual
workings of international courts, and the interactions among those dimensions, depend in large part on the
actions of the judges who subsequently hear disputes, interpret the law, and issue rulings. For insights on
how to conceptualize and understand international judicial behavior, we look beyond the scholarship on
institutional design, and draw inspiration from the rich interdisciplinary literature on judicial politics.11
10 Id. at 226.
11 Id. at 231.
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There is an inherent tension in this attempt to construct a theoretical model that simultaneously captures the
design considerations of the founders of an institution (here, states), and the manner in which these are discharged
by the judicial ofﬁcials who subsequently carry out the functions attributed to them. Is it accurate to say that the
concerns of an institution’s founders necessarily become the predominant concern of the institution’s agents or
ofﬁcials? And if not, is the Judicial Trilemma the intersection in a Venn diagram between the intentions of the
drafters and the intentions of the judges? To my mind, there is a conﬂation between drafters’ intentions, institu-
tional considerations, and the priorities of the individual judges that goes unaddressed in this study but would
merit further consideration.
The concern I have raised recurs throughout the article, and the authors have not separated the issues, generally
preferring to juxtapose freely how states have amended the constituent instruments of international courts, and
when judges have amended their rules of procedure. There are consequences, again, to this conﬂation. If one
distinguishes between state-impelled changes, such as to term lengths and reelection proceedings,12 and court-
impelled changes such as the publication of dissenting opinions or the disclosure of voting, the contrasting con-
cerns become somewhat clearer. As illustrated by Dunoff and Pollack’s ﬁndings, state-led changes have leaned
towards improving accountability or transparency, whilst judge-led modiﬁcations have oscillated between inde-
pendence and transparency.
To give but two examples, ﬁrst, when the European Convention of Human Rights was amended by states par-
ties to provide longer, nonrenewable terms, thus buttressing their independence, the initiative was judge-led, with
many decades elapsing before states would accept the need for such independence.13 Secondly, though the ICJ
amended its Rules in the late 1970s to identify judges who voted for the majority judgment, thus shifting in favor of
a higher degree of transparency, one must recall the context in which the ICJ had been operating: from 1963 to
1970, only one case was submitted, in 1967. This period coincided with the height of the ColdWar but also with the
Court’s infamous judgment in South West Africa,14 which raised serious questions within the Non-Aligned
Movement as to the Court’s suitability to reﬂect the views of all states.15 It cannot be ignored that states’ concerns
would have impelled the judges’ amendments to the ICJ Rules, but these contextual facts are left out of Dunoff
and Pollack’s otherwise thorough analysis. One could say the same about the evolution of the WTO Appellate
Body’s Working Procedures, in which the Appellate Body itself has emphasized the need for consensus in its deci-
sion-making, not somuch out of a need to suppress transparency but a desire to construct a collective, institutional
authority.16
A ﬁnal substantive point merits mention. The authors repeatedly emphasize that civil and common law systems
differ in the structure of their highest courts, with civil law courts in particular reducing judicial identiﬁability and
proscribing public dissent in order to buttress the collective authority of the institution, and common law courts
being nearly invariably designed with an emphasis on public individual opinions and dissents. And yet, the authors
are somewhat dismissive when interviewing international judges who have raised this point; only buried in a foot-
note17 do they suggest that judicial transparency might emanate from a domestic tradition. To my mind, this is
illustrative of the somewhat decontextualized approach the authors have adopted; it ignores legal culture, and the
12 Id. at 234.
13 Id. at 251–52.
14 South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Lib. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 ICJ REP. 6 (July 18).
15 It is also possible, of course, that the Court’s Revision of its Rules coincided with a period of inactivity because it was only during such a
period that the Court would have had the space necessary to embark on such a substantial revision.
16 See the claims by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reﬂections on the Appellate Body of the WTO, 97 ASIL PROC. 77, 78 (2003) (emphasis added),
cited in Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 1, at 266.
17 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 1, at 234, n. 36.
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potential of a speciﬁcally international legal culture. But more than that, it does not give due regard to the systemic
role a judicial institution will play within a legal order. The tradition of dissent in common law jurisdictions does not
derive merely from tradition; in these jurisdictions, judicial decisions contribute directly to the development of the
law; the decisions of the highest courts are in particular a primary source of law! In civil law systems, where in
principle, law emanates from the will of the legislature, the judicial function is perceived not to create law, but
to arrive at the correct interpretation or application of law. This is a caricature, to be sure, and both these dominant
traditions have developed techniques along the way that make them resemble one another in practice. However, to
my mind, the judicial role in law-development, and within the legal system more generally, would have probably
served to modify the Judicial Trilemma from its present form.
Final Reﬂections
Dunoff and Pollack conclude both with a concession towards the need for context in relation to international
judicial institutions, but equally so, a plea favoring their conception of judicial independence, advocating in par-
ticular for publishing separate and dissenting opinions.18 As a normative claim, they are careful to suggest that this
is not a logical corollary of the Judicial Trilemma, which is essentially descriptive in forcing a choice between their
three priorities of independence, transparency, and accountability. That seems perfectly reasonable, and a welcome
concession from the authors. It feels, however, as though the Judicial Trilemma, and the lens through which it
teaches us to analyze the workings of international courts, is itself selective. It privileges three particular values,
suggests that they are the essential and unavoidable values involved in judicial decision-making, and in that act of
privileging, excludes any number of further values. It presumes their objectivity, their universality, and their
abstraction. Seeking as far as possible to engage with the inner logic of Dunoff and Pollack’s article, I have alluded
to two further values, systemic coherence and the authority or status of the institution itself that ﬁnd a basis,
broadly speaking, in the rule of law discourse in which the authors are immersed. But the Judicial Trilemma decon-
textualizes institutions and distances them from a number of further key values that have historically framed inter-
national judicial discourses, that make unique each institution, and that cannot easily be reconciled within its
structures. For the ICJ, it is that enduring struggle between consent and universality, with the effects of decolo-
nization and North-South relations sitting in a legally incommensurable, yet constantly palpable, way. For the
European Court of Justice, an avowedly integrationist perspective towards Europe and the entrenchment of a
European collective consciousness have been paramount in its work. Finally, the WTO has deeply embedded
structures that privilege a certain neoliberal ethos of free trade, with minor concessions to human rights and
the environment embedded ﬁrmly within that approach. One of the issues I have with The Judicial Trilemma is
not that it is incorrect or insufﬁciently grounded, but that it draws attention away from those political dimensions
where the true battlegrounds lie, and which are speciﬁc to each judicial institution. Perhaps it is just a question of
focus, and again, I commend the authors’ admirable engagement with the difﬁcult methodological issues con-
cerned; but in the quest for greater understanding of international judicial processes, more, and not less, context
is crucial.
18 Id. at 274.
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